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How does regulatory capture affect growth? We construct measures of the political power of 
firms and regional regulatory capture using micro-level data on the preferential treatment of firms 
through regional laws and regulations in Russia during the period 1992-2000. Using these measures, 
we find that: 1) politically powerful firms perform better on average; 2) a high level of regulatory 
capture hurts the performance of firms that have no political connections and boosts the 
performance of politically connected firms; 3) capture adversely affects small business growth and 
the tax capacity of the state; 4) there is no evidence that capture affects aggregate growth.  
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“…oligarchy […] throws a close network of dependence 
relationships over all the economic and political institutions  
of present-day bourgeois society without exception…” 
Vladimir Lenin  
(“Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism,” 1916) 
 
1. Introduction 
At least since Olson (1965) and Stigler (1971), economists have recognized the role of 
special interests in shaping institutions, the phenomenon known as “state capture” or “institutional 
subversion.” Throughout history and all across the world firms seek to distort the legal framework, 
justice, rules, and regulations by influencing politicians and bureaucrats. The ability of governments 
to withstand influence varies depending on the local political and economic environment, e.g., on 
industrial concentration, inequality, electoral competition, electoral uncertainty, the awareness of 
voters, the cohesiveness of interest groups, and political centralization.
1
What are the effects of having political power concentrated in the hands of a few firms?  On 
the one hand, as argued by Olson (1982), the domination of special interests can be detrimental to 
economic growth because rent-seeking diverts resources from productive activities and slows down 
innovation.
2  On the other hand, populist governments may harm economic growth more than 
governments influenced by special interests because of excessively high rates of taxation of 
productive capital under the former (Alesina and Rodrik 1994). While the theory gives an 
ambiguous answer, empirically, the question is not settled. 
This paper evaluates the effect of the domination of special interests on the performance of 
firms that do and do not have political power, on aggregate growth, on small business growth, and 
on taxation. We use a unique micro-level dataset on Russian regional laws and regulations that treat 
specific firms preferentially to construct direct measures of firms’ political power and the extent of 
regional capture. This is a panel that contains information on special favors granted by regional 
legislators and regulators to a comprehensive list of the largest firms in each Russian region 
                                                 
1 See Olson (1965, 1982), Stigler (1971), Pelzman (1976), Becker (1983), Laffont and Tirole (1991), Grossman and 
Helpman (2001), Persson and Tabellini (2000), Bardhan and Mookherjee (1999), Parente and Prescott (1999), 
Blanchard and Shleifer (2001), and Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (2003). 
2 Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) generalize and formalize these arguments. 
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between 1992 and 2000. We take the share of favorable laws and regulations received by a firm as a 
proxy for its political power, and the concentration of favors among firms in a region as a measure 
of capture of legislature and regulatory agencies. Most previous empirical studies of the effects of 
regulatory capture, particularly in developing and transition countries, are based on cross-section 
evidence from subjective survey data. In contrast, this paper utilizes objective panel data on the 
outcomes of successful lobbying.
3
  Transition countries provide an ideal experiment for studying private interests’ interference 
in formation of state institutions. Privatization gave rise to substantial wealth inequality in these 
countries, while communism bequeathed weak legal and political institutions. The fragility of 
democratic mechanisms and the low accountability of the state to the public made governments in 
transition easily susceptible to capture. As a result, a newly created group of rich and politically 
powerful was able to shape institution-building processes (Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer 2003; 
Guriev and Rachinsky 2004; Sonin 2003a and 2003b; Hellman 1998; and Ericson 2000). Russia 
provides a particularly good case to study the consequences of capture:  First, the domination of big 
firms makes it easy to identify potential captors. Second, in the early 1990s Russia underwent 
substantial economic and political decentralization in which regions gained autonomy in regulations 
and legislation (Shleifer and Treisman 2000 and OECD 2000). Decentralization resulted in high 
variation in regional political institutions and their vulnerability to special interests, which allows 
comparative analysis. And third, in contrast to most crony capitalist countries, in Russia all regional 
laws and regulations are in the public domain, which is why we were able to collect the data. (In 
contrast, in Uzbekistan legislation that gives favorable treatment to specific firms is a state secret).  
                                                 
3 There is extensive survey evidence from transition countries that shows high cross-country variation in capture (see, 
for instance, Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann, and Schankerman 2000; Hellman and Schankerman 2000; Hellman, Jones, and 
Kaufmann 2003; Hellman and Kaufmann 2003; and Frye 2002). Empirical studies of special interest politics in 
developed countries are relatively scarce, with the exception of the vast literature on campaign contributions in the U.S. 
(surveyed in Mueller 1989). The main reason for this scarcity is the difficulty of finding direct evidence of capture. 
Stigler’s seminal paper (1971) initiated the empirical literature by providing evidence of capture of occupation licensing 
in the US. Examples of recent work include Goldberg and Maggi (1999) on U.S. trade regulations; Tanguay, Lanoie, 
and Moreau (2004) on environmental regulations in OECD countries; and Alt, Carlsen, Heum, and Johansen (1999) on 
government subsidies in Norway.  
  3 
We find that private benefits allow captors to grow faster than their counterparts and that 
these gains to captors increase with an increase in concentration of political power in their hands. 
Capture of laws and regulations has adverse effects on performance and investment of firms that 
have no political influence, on small business growth, and on tax collection. Yet, we do not find 
evidence that aggregate growth has been significantly affected by the extent of regulatory capture.
4  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents hypotheses. Data and measurement are 
described in section 3. We present results in section 4. Conclusions follow in section 5. 
2. Hypotheses 
In this section, we briefly state theoretical predictions about the effects of concentration of 
political power in the hands of a few firms on the growth of these firms, growth of firms that do not 
have political power, aggregate growth, small business development, and regional tax collection. 
Firm performance: First, we compare the performance of firms with and without political 
connections. Firms that are rewarded with favored treatment by bureaucrats and politicians should 
perform better and invest more because they enjoy protection against competition. Since political 
power allows firms to subvert contract enforcement institutions and, therefore, escape punishment 
for breaching contracts, politically influential firms should have higher bargaining power vis-à-vis 
workers and suppliers. Thus, we expect the outcomes of firms’ bargaining with employees and 
contractors to differ for firms with and without political power: the effective costs of inputs should 
be smaller for influential firms. There is much anecdotal evidence that enterprises with direct ties to 
regional authorities have an easier time protecting themselves in regional courts from the lawsuits of 
suppliers and creditors.
5 In addition, the tax arrears of politically influential firms should be higher 
because they lobby for less strict tax enforcement. 
Second, we are interested in how the concentration of political power affects firms. We 
expect a higher concentration of political power to bring greater benefits to the firms that are 
included in the circle of the politically powerful and greater costs to the firms that are excluded from 
                                                 
4 Henceforth, regulatory capture refers to capture of both the legislature and regulatory agencies. 
5 See, for instance, the following media sources: “Vedomosti” April 4, 2000; “Orenburg News” November 11, 2002; 
“Izvestiya” November 15, 2001; and “Interfax” Novermber 15, 2001.
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this circle because of lower competition for capture and smaller dissipation of rents among the 
captors. 
Small business growth: Large firms in transition economies may be interested in small 
business growth because they cannot shed excess labor for political reasons unless there are small 
businesses to absorb it.
6  Small business growth may also be against the interests of large firms 
when they compete with small firms for government resources (Gehlbach 2003) and scarce skilled 
labor (Friebel and Guriev 2002), or in product markets (Lewis 1945). Depending on which of these 
two effects dominates, politically powerful firms will lobby regional authorities for creating either a 
predatory or benign regulatory environment for small business. The reason why large firms may 
find this kind of lobbying worthwhile is that Russia’s regional authorities have considerable 
discretion over regulating small business: they can directly influence entry costs by altering the 
rules of registration, certification, and licensing, and operating costs with the help of inspections and 
regional property leases (see Zhuravskaya 2000 and CEFIR Monitoring Report 2002). In addition, if 
large enterprises divert government spending, there are fewer resources left for investing in 
infrastructure for small business and the salaries of bureaucrats who see preying on small business 
as an alternative source of income (Gehlbach 2003).  
Aggregate growth: Capture should result in lower investment and growth in discriminated 
firms and higher investment and growth in politically influential firms. In theory, the aggregate 
effect is ambiguous. Olson (1982) used case studies of post-war Europe and India, and Japan in the 
20
th century, to argue that special interests hurt aggregate growth. We test for this effect in our data. 
Tax collection and arrears: Tax collections from politically influential firms are expected to 
decrease with an increase in the level of capture because vested interests lobby for tax breaks. Under 
the conditions of an underdeveloped small and medium-size business sector and a sizable unofficial 
economy (e.g., Russia in the 1990s), aggregate tax collections should be affected by capture because 
large enterprises with political influence usually happen to be the primary contributors to regional 
                                                 
6 McMillan and Woodruff (2002) survey the evidence that new jobs in transition economies come from the small 
business sector. 
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budgets. Federal tax arrears may increase with capture because regional authorities can protect firms 




To measure capture and firms’ political power, we constructed a database of regional laws 
and regulations which treat selected large firms in these regions preferentially. For feasibility 
reasons, we set boundaries to our analysis of Russian regional legislation, limiting ourselves to the 
largest firms in each region because political influence is most likely concentrated in the hands of 
the largest firms. We started with a list of firms which at least once during 1992 - 2000 were among 
the five firms with the largest sales in each region.
8 The list contained 978 firms – up to the 20 
largest firms in each of 73 regions (autonomous okrugs excluded). We searched the comprehensive 
database of Russia’s regional legislation “Consultant Plus” 
(www.consultant.ru/Software/Systems/RegLaw) for any preferential treatment of each of these 
firms for each year between 1992 and 2000. We deemed an enterprise to be treated preferentially if 
it received any of the following benefits: tax breaks, investment credits, subsidies, subsidized loans 
and loans with a regional budget guarantee, official delays in tax payments, subsidized licensing, 
free grants of state property, or a special “open economic zone” status for their territory. The most 
common preferential treatment is a tax break (46% of the total number of preferential treatments); 
the second most common is a subsidized loan from the budget or a direct government subsidy 
(26%); the next largest group of preferential treatments is subsidized energy prices (5%). 
Typical examples of preferential treatment legislation are as follows. In 1998, the Volgograd 
regional legislature adopted the law “On a special economic zone on the territory of Volgograd 
                                                 
7 Regional protection from paying federal taxes has been studied by Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya (2004); Cai and 
Treisman (2004); Lambert-Mogiliansky, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya (2003); and Sonin (2003a). 
8 As a baseline we do not distinguish between state-owned and private large firms because survey evidence (see, for 
instance, Frye 2002) shows that in Russia state-owned firms are engaged in state capture as much as private firms. Since 
the state does not have close control over state-owned firms, the managers of state-owned firms appropriate both control 
and cash flows for their private benefit. As a robustness check we repeated all of the analysis for just the five largest 
non-state firms in each region. The results are qualitatively the same irrespective of whether we base our measures of 
capture and political power on data for both state and non-state firms or for non-state firms only. 
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Tractor Plant (VTP).” The law relieves all firms of paying regional and local taxes for the period of 
ten years if these firms operate on the territory of VTP and at least 30% of their assets are in VTP’s 
ownership. In Adygeya Republic in 1999 a law was enacted “On preferential tax treatment of the 
meat-packing plant Li-Chet-Nekul.”  The law grants this plant a property tax break for a period of 
two years. The budget law of Kamchatskaya Oblast of 2001 contained a special budgetary item 
called “support of fishing industries.”  It postulated that only one firm, named Akros, receive a large 
sum of money. There were many fishing firms in Kamchatskaya Oblast at that time, but no other 
firm was mentioned in the budget law. 
We produced the number of regional laws and regulations that grant distinct preferential 
treatments to each firm in the sample each year. To check the quality of these data, we correlate 
firms’ preferential treatments with budgetary subsidies reported in firms’ balance sheets and find a 
strong significant correlation despite the fact that direct subsidies are not the most common type of 
preferential treatments. Between 1992 and 2000, 41% of firms in the sample received at least one 
preferential treatment; 23% of firms received at least two preferential treatments; and 21% of firms 
received preferential treatments for at least two years. During 1996 - 2000, each year on average 
17% of firms were treated preferentially and 18% of firms received preferential treatments for at 
least two years. Preferential treatments are persistent: If a firm receives preferential treatments in 
any particular year, there is an over 60% chance that it also receives preferential treatments in the 
subsequent or the previous year.
9
An important question is how many preferential treatments are given to firms outside our 
sample of firms. In five regions, we searched legislation for the fifty largest firms and did not find 
any preferential treatment granted to firms outside our original sample.
10
                                                 
9 Each of the 73 regions issued at least one preferential treatment between 1992 and 2000. The number of regions that 
granted preferential treatments and the average number of preferential treatments granted by a region were steadily 
increasing during 1992-1999, and decreased following Putin’s centralization by a third of the initial increase. 
10 Most regional economies are very concentrated; and preferential treatments are given to the largest firms: on average, 
the largest firm in a region produces 43% and the fifth largest firm produces 8% of the consolidated output of the five 
largest firms in the region; the largest firm’s output is twice as large as the output of the second largest firm and three 
times as large as the output of the third largest. On average, the five largest firms together produce 50% of total regional 
output (SE is 0.6%). 
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Using the preferential treatment data, we constructed measures of regional regulatory 
capture and firms’ political power. Regional capture each year is measured by the concentration 
(Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) of preferential treatments for the five firms with the largest number 
of preferential treatments. We focus on the concentration rather than the number of preferential 
treatments because we are interested in the effect of the concentration of political power in hands of 
few firms. The total number of preferential treatments in the region may just reflect the general level 
of paternalism of the regional governments: If a regional government gives preferential treatments 
to all firms, none is treated preferentially. We use the total number of preferential treatments as a 
control in all regressions. We use information only for the five largest recipients of preferential 
treatments in each region to make the measures comparable across regions. (As a rule, fewer than 
six firms receive preferential treatments over the course of one year in any given region.) The 
political power of each firm each year is measured by the share of this firm’s preferential treatments 
in the total number of preferential treatments given to the five firms with the largest number of 
preferential treatments in the region. Again, to control for paternalism, we focus on the relative 
rather than raw number of preferential treatments.  
Table A1 in the appendix illustrates the construction of preferential treatment concentration 
and the regional number of preferential treatments for three regions: a typical region (Omsk oblast), 
the most captured region (Chelyabinsk oblast), and the most non-captured region (Arkhangelsk 
oblast).
11 Table 1 presents summary statistics and Table A2 presents the average index of regional 
capture for 1995-2000.
12
                                                 
11 For example, in 1996 in Omsk oblast, the firm “Omskshina” received three preferential treatments, the firm “Polet” 
received two, and “Omskenergo” received one preferential treatment. Thus, the shares of preferential treatments for 




2; and the number of preferential treatments was 6=3+2+1. (Overall there are 
thirteen firms from Omsk oblast in our sample.) 
12 Preferential treatment data have the following significant drawbacks:  First, we cannot compare the importance of 
different preferential treatments (i.e., we cannot quantify the value a tax break or the transfer of a large piece of land to a 
firm for free); thus, we just count the number of legislative acts with preferential treatments. Second, we can identify 
preferential treatment only when texts of the law contain direct reference to a firm. An example of a preferential 
treatment that cannot be systematically accounted for and, thus, is excluded from the data, comes from the legislation of 
Briansk Oblast. The 1997 law “On the regulation of the alcohol market” stated that alcohol is to be sold only by 
accredited firms. Any firm could get accreditation from the regional administration if it satisfied a list of criteria (for 
instance, by being present in the market for several years, having a storage facility of a certain size, etc.). Products sold 
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To supplement the preferential treatments data, we use the following panel data: Financial 
and other statistical data on enterprises come from the Russian Enterprise Registry Longitudinal 
Dataset (RERLD) and ALBA datasets. RERLD covers the basic financial statistics for large and 
medium-size firms in Russia, with data spanning the period from 1992 to 2000; Brown and Earle 
(2000) provide a detailed description of the database. ALBA contains the balance sheets of large 
and medium-size firms between 1996 and 1999. Regional budgetary data for 1996 - 2000 come 
from the Ministry of Finance (www.minfin.ru).  Other region-level statistics come from 
Goskomstat, Russia’s official statistical agency (http://www.gks.ru/catalog/default.asp). For the 
most part, Goskomstat’s regional series are available for 1996-2000, but some (e.g., retail turnover) 
start in 1992. 
4. Results 
Performance and investment of firms with and without political power 
First, we investigate whether firms with political power grow faster, perform better, and 
have superior outcomes in bargaining with suppliers and employees compared to similar firms that 
have no political power. We measure performance by growth in sales, employment, fixed capital, 
labor productivity, and profitability. Outcomes of firms’ bargaining with suppliers and workers are 
measured by arrears to suppliers and wage arrears, respectively. We look at arrears because large 
firms in Russia reduce costs primarily by running arrears rather than negotiating input prices. In 
addition, we look at the effect of political power on tax arrears. As discussed in the hypotheses 
section, we expect firms with political power to have superior performance, but maintain higher 
wage, trade, and tax arrears. 
We estimate the long-run relationship between performance and political power of firms 
using between-effects regressions (i.e., regressions of over-time sample averages), controlling for 
initial performance and region-specific fixed effects:  
                                                                                                                                                                    
by firms without accreditation were subject to confiscation. There were many firms in the market at that time, but only 
one firm satisfied the criteria outlined in the law. Despite these drawbacks, our measures of regional-level capture and 
firms’ political influence survive a number of reality checks that we discuss below when talk about a possible 
alternative explanation of the results. 
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f f f ft f f r controls y share PT y ε α α α + + + + = 3 2 1 0 _ .              (1) 
and the short run relationship using firm-specific fixed effects regressions: 
ft f ft 4 1 ft ft ft ft controls number PT concentr PT share PT y ε φ α α α α + + + + + = − − _ _ _ 3 1 2 1     (2)  
where   stands for log of an indicator of firms’ performance or arrears; the subscripts f and t 
identify firms and years; and the subscript   denotes the initial year.
y
0 t
13  PT_share is the firm’s share 
of preferential treatments. PT_concentr is the preferential treatment concentration and PT_number 
is the total number of preferential treatments in the region; both are calculated for the five firms–
recipients of the largest number of preferential treatments.  f φ  and   are firm and region fixed 
effects, respectively. Upper bars denote average values of variables across all years excluding the 
initial year. We are interested in the coefficient of the share of preferential treatments (our measure 
of a firm’s political power).
f r
14
We run both basic OLS and IV regressions. A potential source of endogeneity in these 
regressions is the quite plausible dependence of the firms’ shares of preferential treatments on their 
performance. We use the relative initial size of the firm in between-effects regressions and the two-
year lag of the relative size in fixed-effects regressions as instruments for preferential treatment 
shares, as the initial size of a firm relative to other firms in the region is the best predictor of the 
likelihood of receiving preferential treatments in the future. Again, to have comparability across 
regions, size is calculated relative to the five largest firms in the region.
15
                                                 
13 Initial years are different for different dependent variables because of data availability. Data on employment, 
profitability, sales, labor productivity, and fixed capital are available for 1992–2000; data on wage, trade, and tax arrears 
are available for 1996–2000. Whenever profits are below zero, log profitability is defined as -log(-profitability). 
14 In the fixed-effects regressions, we smooth the PT_share variable over two years (the current and the previous) to 
minimize its volatility. Without taking this average, the power of the instrument (described below) is too low. 
15 In the IV fixed-effects regressions, relative employment is a proxy for size. To increase the power of this instrument, 
we have to limit the sample to observations in regions and years for which the total number of regional preferential 
treatments is greater than zero, as only in this case is initial relative employment highly correlated with the share of 
preferential treatments. In the case where the regional number of preferential treatments is zero, the share of preferential 
treatments is constant across firms while size varies. In the IV between-effects regressions, we take the relative size of 
capital as a proxy for size, as it has the best explanatory power for preferential treatments. One exception is the 
regression with fixed capital as dependent variable, where this instrument is collinear with the initial level of the 
dependent variable in the first-stage regression; in that case we instrument with relative initial employment. Henceforth, 
F-statistics for the instruments from the first-stage regressions are reported for each regression in the bottom row of the 
tables with results. 
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  Since a firm’s benefit from political connections depends on the concentration of political 
power among firms (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2003), we control for the scale of regional 
capture. In the fixed-effects regressions, we include the lagged preferential treatment concentration 
and the lagged total number of regional preferential treatments to control for capture.
16 In between-
effects regressions, region fixed effects account for all regional differences. National market share is 
a control for market power in regressions for productivity, profitability, investment, and arrears (this 
is an important control because preferential treatments are given to large firms). In fixed-effects 
regressions, we use lagged values, and in between-effects regressions initial values, of this variable. 
In between-effects regressions, the state enterprise dummy accounts for the difference in 
performance of state and private firms and industry dummies control for industry-level 
performance. We also add dummies for firms that drop out and appear in the enterprise registry 
between 1996 and 2000, since the particular stage of these firms’ life cycle may affect performance. 
Eliminating these firms from the sample does not affect the results. Finally, we allow error terms to 
be clustered within regions. Since the vast majority of firms in our sample are non-traded, we have 
no data to control for firms’ investment opportunities (e.g., Tobin’s Q). 
The results are consistent with our hypotheses. There is a strong robust effect of political 
power on firm performance: firms that enjoy a disproportionate number of preferential treatments 
exhibit significantly faster growth in profitability, sales, employment, and fixed capital. Despite 
these performance gains, politically influential firms accumulate tax, wage, and trade arrears 
significantly faster than their not-politically-connected counterparts. OLS and IV regressions 
produce similar results, with an increase in the magnitude and significance levels of the coefficients 
in the IV regressions.  Henceforth, as a baseline, we report IV regression results because, in our 
view, both endogeneity and measurement error are important in this context.  
                                                 
16 In the firm-level fixed-effects regressions PT_concentr and PT_number are very highly correlated; thus, we 
orthogonalize them before including them in the regression. An alternative approach of including just PT_concentr 
(without controlling for PT_number) leads to the same results. We use lags because we do not have appropriate 
instruments for these two variables in this specification. 
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We illustrate the basic cross-section regularities in the data in Figure 1. The first chart in the 
figure reports the means of performance indicators along with their confidence intervals for the two 
equal-sized sub-samples. Firms are sorted into the subsamples on the basis of their average 
preferential treatment share. Firms with the highest shares of preferential treatments have better 
performance and higher arrears than firms with the lowest shares of preferential treatments. Table 2 
presents results of the estimation of equation (1) using instrumental variables. The results confirm 
the basic correlations: A ten percent increase in the average share of preferential treatments over 
eight years (from a mean value of 0.15; SD = 0.09) leads to significant increases in average 
profitability of 37%, sales of 40%, productive capital of 34%, employment of 16%, arrears to 
suppliers of 18%, wage arrears of 34%, and tax arrears of 29%. 
Results of fixed-effects regressions (2) are presented in Table 3. They are very similar to the 
long-run results. Recipients of preferential treatments experience significantly higher employment 
and sales growth, investment, and growth in wage and tax arrears compared to firms that do not 
receive preferential treatments. A ten percent increase in the preferential treatment share in one year 
(from a mean value of 0.11; SD = 0.16) leads to increases in employment of 9.7%, sales of 9.7%, 
fixed capital of 6.7%, wage arrears of 13.5%, and tax arrears of 6.5%. Hellman, Jones, and 
Kaufmann (2003) report that firms do not expect benefits from political power to be sustained in the 
long run. Our results show that performance gains from political influence are persistent. 
Performance of firms with no political power in environments with high and low capture 
Second, we investigate how regional capture affects firms with no political power. We run 
between-effects regressions for performance and investment on the subsample of firms that did not 
receive any preferential treatment:  
f ft f f f controls y number PT concentr PT y ε α α α α + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 _ _ .        (3) 
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Again, we run both IV and OLS regressions. In IV regressions, preferential treatment concentration 
and the number of preferential treatments are instrumented by their initial values.
17 The firm-level 
and industry-level controls are the same as in equation (2). Since our main variable of interest now 
is measured at the regional level, we use the following regional-level controls instead of region 
fixed effects: the proportion of the regional population with higher education, the size of the 
regional population, the share of oil and gas industries in regional industrial production, and initial 
regional per capita investment. Error terms are clustered within regions.  
The results are again consistent with our hypothesis. Firms that have no political connections 
invest more and perform better in regions where political power is less concentrated. The results of 
IV and OLS regressions go in the same direction, but the OLS results are somewhat weaker. The 
cross-section results are illustrated in the second chart of Figure 1. This chart presents the means of 
performance indicators (with confidence intervals) for firms that did not receive preferential 
treatments in two groups of regions, where regions are sorted into groups according to the residual 
preferential treatment concentration after accounting for the number of preferential treatments. 
Among firms with no political power, investment, growth in sales, and productivity are significantly 
higher when firms are located in regions with low capture compared to when they are located in 
regions with high capture. IV regression results are presented in the first five columns of Table 4: A 
one standard deviation increase in the log preferential treatment concentration in a region leads to 
decreases in labor productivity growth of 29%, sales growth of 36%, and investment of 29% in an 
average large firm that does not have political power.
18 The coefficients of preferential treatment 
concentration in regressions for other indicators of firm performance also have the predicted 
negative sign (but are insignificant). As a robustness check, we run the same regression on a larger 
                                                 
17 To improve the quality of instruments, we use data between 1996 and 2000 for over-time averages and take the log of 
preferential treatment concentration. The logarithm of preferential treatment concentration is instrumented by the 
concentration of the sum of preferential treatments that firms received between 1992 and 1995. The number of 
preferential treatments is instrumented by the total number of preferential treatments issued by the region to the five 
largest recipients of preferential treatments between 1992 and 1995. 
18 A one standard deviation increase in log average preferential treatment concentration from the mean implies that, in 
four out of five years, the number of preferential treatments for each of the five largest recipients remains unchanged: 
the largest recipient gets two preferential treatments, another two enterprises receive one each and no other firm receives 
preferential treatments; but in the fifth year, only one firm receives four preferential treatments. 
  13 
sample of firms. To the subsample of firms that have no preferential treatments in our sample, we 
add firms from the ALBA dataset that are not in our primary sample and operate in the same 
industries and regions as the firms in our primary sample. We do not have information on 
preferential treatments for these firms, but they are sufficiently small to assume that they have no 
political power. The results are similar (not reported): in all regressions, the coefficients of 
PT_concentr are negative. A one standard deviation increase in the log preferential treatment 
concentration leads to significant decreases in profitability, sales, and employment growth in an 
average firm of 43%, 30%, and 25%, respectively. 
Performance of firms that are treated preferentially in environments with high and low capture 
How does regional capture affect firms-recipients of preferential treatments? We run 
between-effects regressions for performance and investment on the subsample of firms that receive 
preferential treatments, limiting the analysis to years in which these firms were treated 
preferentially. We use the same specification (3) as above. Cross-sectional results are illustrated in 
the third chart of Figure 1: firms-recipients of preferential treatments on average have higher 
performance when preferential treatments are concentrated; but only two out of five differences are 
significant. The IV regression results are presented in the last five columns of Table 4. A one 
standard deviation increase in preferential treatment concentration leads to increases in labor 
productivity growth of 85%, sales growth of 100%, and investment growth of 56% in firms that 
receive preferential treatments. 
Next, we study the effect of capture on regional economies. 
Effects of capture on aggregate growth and small business growth 
We use two alternative proxies for small business development: log share of small business 
employment and log retail turnover per capita.
19  Aggregate economic growth is measured by the 
change in gross regional product per capita. To study the relationship in the long run, we run 
                                                 
19 Retail turnover is used as an indirect proxy because reporting on retail turnover is often much better than on small- 
business employment: many small firms underreport employment for tax evasion purposes. Thus, retail turnover is less 
susceptible to the size of the unofficial economy, which can be related to regulatory environment. See Johnson, 
Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) for theory and cross-country evidence and Frye and Zhuravskaya (2000) for enterprise- 
survey evidence. 
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between-effects regressions. Specifications of these regressions are analogous to equation (3), with 
the only difference that the data are at the level of regions rather than firms. We control for initial 
level of the dependent variable, initial level of regional education (with the share of labor force that 
attained higher education), and size of the region (with log population); we also include year 
dummies. In regressions for small business, the outside option for employees of the small-business 
sector is controlled for with the average wage in the industrial sector. In the GRP growth regression, 
we control for the initial level of regional investment and the share of the oil and gas industry.
20 As 
above, we run both OLS and IV regressions. In IV regressions, both the preferential treatment 
concentration and the number of preferential treatments are instrumented. Preferential treatment 
concentration is instrumented with two variables: the initial preferential treatment concentration and 
a dummy for ethnic republic. The first instrument reflects persistence of capture; the second 
measures the extent of political cohesion, which is generally smaller in ethnic republics.
21  The 
number of preferential treatments is instrumented by the average number of preferential treatments 
in the three initial years. 
Figure 2 illustrates cross-section regression results for all regional-level between effects 
regressions; it presents partial residual scatter plots of relationships between capture and dependent 
variables after accounting for control variables. The first two plots show significant residual 
correlation of capture, on the one hand, and small business growth and growth in retail turnover, on 
the other. The results of the corresponding IV regressions are presented in the first two columns of 
Table 5. Small business development is significantly negatively related to capture. A one standard 
deviation increase in the average preferential treatment concentration leads to a 6% decrease in 
retail turnover and a 10% decrease in the share of small business employment.
22  
                                                 
20 Controls are motivated by the growth literature. See, for instance, Barro 1997, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995, and 
Sala-i-Martin 1997. Life expectancy was excluded from the list of controls because it has insufficient variation across 
regions. Wage level is instrumented by its initial level to avoid endogeneity. 
21 The initial preferential treatment concentration is constructed as the average PT_concentr for the initial three years (t0, 
t-1, and t-2). The initial year for each dependent variable is defined as follows: retail turnover per capita - 1995; share of 
small business employment - 1997; GRP per capita - 1994. The last year for which the data are available is 2000. 
22 A one standard deviation increase in the average regional preferential treatment concentration from the mean implies 
that, in five out of six years, the number of preferential treatments for each of the five largest recipients remains 
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In addition, we study the short-run relationship between capture and small business with 
fixed-effects OLS regressions: measures of regional small business are regressed on the lagged 
preferential treatment concentration controlling for the lagged number of preferential treatments, 
lagged population, and industry wage instrumented by its lagged value.
23 The results are presented 
in the second two columns of Table 5. In the short run, preferential treatment concentration has a 
significant negative effect on the share of small business employment. A one standard deviation 
increase in the preferential treatment concentration leads to a decrease in the share of small business 
employment of 2.4% in the same year.
24
Overall, our hypothesis that vested interests get in the way of small-business growth finds 
support in the data. In contrast, aggregate growth is unaffected by capture. There is no statistically 
significant relationship between preferential treatment concentration, on the one hand, and six-year 
growth of GRP per capita, on the other (see column 5 of Table 5). 
Tax collection and arrears  
We study the effect of capture on tax capacity of the state using fixed-effects regressions 
analogous to the specification used for small-business growth in the short run. Gross regional 
product is included in the list of regressors to control for the size of regional tax base. Plots in the 
second row of Figure 2 illustrate the cross-section results. Concentration of preferential treatments 
(controlling for their number) is negatively correlated with tax revenues; is positively correlated 
with federal tax arrears; and is uncorrelated with regional tax arrears. The last three columns of 
Table 5 present the results of IV regressions: Holding regional product and the number of 
preferential treatments constant, a one standard deviation increase in the preferential treatment 
                                                                                                                                                                    
unchanged: the largest recipient gets two preferential treatments, another two enterprises receive one each and no other 
firm receives preferential treatments; but in the sixth year, only one firm receives four preferential treatments. 
23 The exact specification is as follows: 
it i t it it it it it dummies year wage ind pop PTs of number PTC SMB ε ρ α α α α α + + + + + + = − − − ) ( ) . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 5 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 . There are no 
valid instruments for PT_concentr and PT_number; thus, we take one-year lags. Following the growth literature, we do 
not test for the relationship between the short-run changes in capture and per- capita GRP because short-run changes in 
GRP are primarily driven by business cycles.  
24 A one standard deviation increase in preferential treatment concentration from the mean value implies that among the 
five largest recipients of preferential treatments in one year, the distribution of the number of preferential treatments 
changes from {2; 1; 1; 0; 0} to {3, 1, 0; 0; 0}. 
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concentration leads to a 1.2% decrease in regional tax revenues and a 2.7% increase in federal tax 
arrears.
25 The coefficient of preferential treatment concentration in the regression for regional tax 
arrears is insignificant and smaller in magnitude than in regression for federal arrears. This result 
supports the view that Russia’s regional governments protect firms from paying federal taxes.
26
An alternative story 
Stigler (1971) discusses two alternative views on the nature of regulation: public choice 
versus public interest. According to the public choice theory, regulation is captured by and benefits 
special interests. In contrast, the public interest theory presumes that regulation is instituted for 
protection of the public and benefits the public. One can argue that special interests are not the only 
possible reason for concentration of preferential treatments. Welfare-maximizing and opportunistic 
career-motivated politicians may want to appeal to the majority by giving out preferential treatments 
to infant industries (for temporarily protection from competition), to foreign direct investors (to 
attract foreign capital to the region), to firms in distress (to internalize the social costs of 
bankruptcy), and to firms with high employment (for redistribution purposes) (Gray 1973, 1975, 
Corden 1974, and Baldwin 1989). If, however, one recognizes that firms that may receive 
preferential treatments from the government behave strategically in order to obtain preferential 
treatment, one is back in the world of special interests politics, as firms use the political objectives 
of government officials in order to obtain rents. The literature on soft budget constraints (see 
Shleifer and Vishny 1994; Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny 1996; and Bennedsen 2000) illustrates this 
point by focusing on bargaining between politicians and firms over excess employment. In our case, 
it is particularly unlikely that firms take legislation and regulations as given because we look at the 
                                                 
25 It is worth noting that it is very important to control for the number of preferential treatments in these regressions 
since the relationship between the number of preferential treatments and taxes is purely mechanical: preferential 
treatments cost money. 
26 The capture of legislatures and regulatory agencies reflected in preferential treatment concentration is an indication of 
merely one aspect of a broader phenomenon of institutional subversion. In particular, the political influence of vested 
interests extends to law enforcement. To check the robustness of our results, we take output concentration among the ten 
largest non-state firms in each region as a measure of regional potential capture. The rationale behind this measure is 
that bigger agents organize interests more easily (Grossman and Helpman 2001; Sonin 2003a; Glaeser, Scheinkman, and 
Shleifer 2003). We find that a one standard deviation increase in the output concentration among the ten largest firms 
(from a mean value of 0.226) leads to a decrease in the share of small business employment of 23% and in regional tax 
collection of 6.1%, all else equal. 
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largest firms in each region and because preferential treatments in our dataset are given to specific 
individual firms. Thus, our presumption is that firms actively seek preferential treatment. 
A number of reality checks on our measures of firms’ political influence and regional-level 
capture suggest that concentration of preferential treatments, indeed, reflects subversion of 
government institutions. First, the residuals of preferential treatment concentration after controlling 
for the total number of preferential treatments are highly significantly correlated with other 
measures of state capture that are available for a limited number of years and regions. These 
measures come from expert evaluations and surveys. For example, preferential treatment 
concentration has a correlation coefficient of 0.4 (significant at a 1% significance level) with the 
Transparency International (TI) and Information for Democracy (INDEM) state capture rating.
27 
Figure 3 illustrates this correlation. Preferential treatment concentration is also negatively correlated 
with the Institute of Free Media regional index of press freedom (correlation coefficient is -0.4, 
significant at a 1% significance level).
28  In addition, preferential treatment concentration for a 
given number of preferential treatments is positively significantly correlated with various measures 
of administrative corruption (also available from TI and INDEM). Regional poverty and 
unemployment are unrelated to past, present, or future preferential treatment concentration. At the 
firm level, the best predictors of the share of preferential treatments are proxies for the firm size. 
Controlling for size, however, the share of favorable legislation is positively significantly correlated 
with increases in firm’s profitability. These pieces of evidence suggest that our measures adequately 
reflect variation in regulatory capture. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the effects of capture of legislature and regulatory agencies by few 
politically powerful firms on growth of these firms, growth of firms that do not exercise political 
influence, and on aggregate growth. We construct measures of regional capture and firm’s political 
                                                 
27 This variable is available for 39 regions in 2001. All TI and INDEM data, along with their description, can be found 
at http://www.anti-corr.ru/rating_regions/index.htm. 
28 This index is available for 72 regions in 1999 and 2000. The data and construction methodology can be found at 
www.freepress.ru. 
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power based on unique micro-level data on preferential treatment of individual firms by regional 
laws and regulations. 
The key findings can be summarized as follows.  
1) Political power yields substantial performance gains to firms. Politically powerful firms enjoy 
higher growth in profitability, sales, and employment compared to their counterparts. Firms with 
political power are also found to have better outcomes of bargaining with workers, suppliers, and 
tax collectors: despite the performance gains, they are able to sustain higher growth in wage, trade, 
and tax arrears. 2) Capture hurts firms that do not have political power: their investment and 
performance decrease with an increase in the level of capture. 3) Firms benefit more from 
preferential treatments by regional authorities in regions with higher levels of capture. 4) Capture 
negatively affects small business growth and government revenue. 5) There is no evidence that 
capture had a significant impact on aggregate regional growth over a six-year period. 
Capture of legislation by few large firms is only the tip of the iceberg of the broader 
phenomenon of subversion of law and order. Following Olson (1965) and Stigler (1971), we 
document that large firms obtain regulations and laws that benefit them at the expense of other 
economic agents. Some examples of the adverse effects of captured regulations and laws are as 
follows: firms with no political power suffer from unfair competition and trade arrears; employees 
of politically powerful firms are not paid wages in full; and the general public is affected through 
poorer public-goods provision because the tax capacity of the state decreases with capture. 
Olson (1982) argued that capture necessarily hurts aggregate growth. Even though we found 
that aggregate growth was not significantly affected by capture, in the context of a transition 
economy the result that capture creates obstacles to small-business development may have severe 
long-term growth implications because it becomes an impediment to asset reallocation from an old, 
rigid, and unproductive sector to a new, dynamic, and more productive sector. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of measures of regional capture and firms' political influence 
              Obs Mean SD Min Median Max
Firms:          
Share of preferential treatments  7,167  0.15  0.16  0  0.2  1 
Average across-years share of preferential treatments  962  0.15  0.09  0  0.13  0.79 
Average share of preferential treatments for two consecutive years  3,526  0.11  0.16  0  0.1  1 
Log of average across years preferential treatment concentration for the 
subsample of firms that do not receive preferential treatments
  518           
           
           
        
-0.99 0  .29 -1.6   -0.78 -0.20
Average across years preferential treatment concentration for the subsample 
of firms that receive preferential treatments
  149 0.38 0  .22 0.20   0.32 1
Total number of preferential treatments 7,284 0.14 0.41 0  4 0
Regions: 
Preferential treatment concentration
∇ 667           
           
0.40 0.29 0.20 0.20 1
Total number of preferential treatments in the region  667  1.41  1.99  0  0  11 
Across years average of preferential treatment concentration  73 0.42 0.12 0.23 0.84 0.4
∇ The mean value of preferential treatment concentration (0.40) corresponds to the common situation when in a particular year one firm in a 
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-6.19                  24.56 26.58 22.85 10.71 22.58 11.41 18.46  Firm’s share of preferential 
treatments (Instr-d)  (3.73)               
                 
               
          
             
               
               
             
               
               
               
                 
               
                 
                 
               
                 
               
(10.63)** (12.13)** (12.50)* (4.19)** (7.06)*** (4.88)** (4.90)***
  0.35 0.27 0.22 0.58 0.67 0.36 0.5 0.4





-0.24 -0.66 0.68 4.24 1.11 4.31 Initial national market share  (0.67) (2.88) (1.22) (3.00) (2.15) (2.50)*
0.14 1.71 1.38 -0.15 0.62 0.51 0.72 0.37 New enterprise dummy  (0.29) (0.66)** (0.54)** (0.31) (0.25)** (0.48) (0.27)**
 
(0.40)
0.56 0.07 -0.51 1.00 -0.37 Dropped out dummy  (0.24)** (0.52) (0.61) (0.67) (0.20)*
-0.17 -0.43 -0.43 -0.61 -0.12 -1.2 -0.61 -0.9 State enterprise dummy  (0.11) (0.37) (0.22)* (0.46) (0.16) (0.67)* (0.35)* (0.60)
Constant
   
3.82 3.07 5.53 1.75 0.62 1.81 3.96 2.2
(0.51)*** (1.30)** (1.03)*** (1.13) (0.48) (0.81)** (0.94)*** (0.74)***
Industry  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional  fixed  effects
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5274 5061 5512 5293 5462 1479 1472 1474
Number  of  firms 861 874 873 886 898 667 667 667
F-statistics for the instrument 
in the first stage  15.17 12.93 7.69 6.79 6.69 12.61 10.73 13.38
Note: All dependent variables are in logs. In all regressions but the regression with fixed capital as dependent variable, the share of preferential treatments is 
instrumented by the initial relative size of fixed capital. In the regression with fixed capital as dependent variable, the share of preferential treatments is instrumented 
by the initial relative employment size. The choice of instruments is driven by their explanatory power in the first-stage regression. Robust standard errors clustered at 
the regional level are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.. 
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-1.73                4.34 8.86 6.10 8.83 12.30 2.55 6.01 Firm’s share of preferential 
treatments (Instr-d)  (1.60)               
               
               
               
               
           
           
               
               
               
             
               
               
               
                 
               
(3.35) (3.47)** (2.03)*** (2.99)*** (5.30)** (2.11) (3.06)**
-0.06 0.24 0.56 0.35 0.49 0.62 0.20 0.41 Lag of residual preferential treatment 
concentration  (0.10) (0.20) (0.21)*** (0.12)*** (0.18)*** (0.29)** (0.11)* (0.18)**
-0.02 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.02 Lag of the number of preferential 





2.17 -0.29 -1.30 4.50 1.36 1.77 Lag of national market share 
(0.57)***  (1.60) (1.00) (2.54)* (0.99) (1.69)
-0.05 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.11 -0.01 0.02 0.09 Regional trend 
(0.02)* (0.03)*** (0.06) (0.09) (0.19) (0.11) (0.05) (0.10)
0.81 0.11 -0.01 0.53 0.40 -0.02 0.13 0.36 Industry trend 
(0.10)***  (0.04)*** (0.09) (0.28)* (0.22)* (0.25) (0.10) (0.21)*
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects for firms 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2623 2545 2791 2590 2697 1408 1392 1390
Number  of  firms 761 735 783 753 765 619 616 618
F-statistics for the instrument in the 
first stage  6.75 13.54 8.97 13.25 9.35 6.80 6.88 10.50
Note: All dependent variables are in logs. In all regressions, the share of preferential treatments is instrumented by the two-year lag of employment share. In order for the 
instrument to be correlated with the average firm’s share of preferential treatments, observations were excluded from the sample when annual number of regional 
preferential treatments is zero. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%.. 
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Preferential treatment concentration (Instr-d)  -1.00 -0.63 -1.25 -0.99 -0.17 3.85 0.93 4.54 2.53 -0.04
(0.35)*** (0.44) (0.54)** (0.34)*** (0.17) (1.10)*** (3.34) (0.90)*** (1.41)* (0.69)
Number of preferential treatments (Instr-d) 0.12 0.03 0.29 0.09 0.04 0.21 -0.36 0.22 0.32 -0.02
(0.10) (0.18) (0.14)** (0.08) (0.06) (0.11)* (0.23) (0.10)** (0.09)*** (0.07)
Initial level of depend variable 0.23 0.23 0.44 0.60 0.82 0.60 0.19 0.82 0.71 0.81
(0.04)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.11)*** (0.09)** (0.06)*** (0.14)*** (0.06)***
Share of oil & gas in regional industrial production -0.43 -0.21 -0.32 0.04 -0.16 0.82 -2.48 0.70 0.71 -0.51
(0.27) (0.51) (0.36) (0.20) (0.18) (0.54) (1.11)** (0.46) (0.29)** (0.44)
New enterprise dummy 0.59 0.87 0.41 -0.02 0.11 0.38 0.72 -0.03 0.13 0.00
(0.09)*** (0.19)*** (0.10)*** (0.09) (0.07) (0.19)* (0.44) (0.21) (0.19) (0.15)
State enterprise dummy -0.47 -0.49 -0.38 -0.11 -0.02 -0.08 -0.26 -0.05 -0.08 -0.15
(0.14)*** (0.21)** (0.18)** (0.08) (0.07) (0.19) (0.44) (0.15) (0.21) (0.12)
Size of regional population 0.29 0.20 0.57 0.05 0.16 0.14 0.09 0.22 0.10 0.11
(0.06)*** (0.11)* (0.13)*** (0.04) (0.05)*** (0.10) (0.21) (0.11)** (0.05)* (0.04)**
Initial share of educated population -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.08 -0.01 0.01 -0.03
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)*** (0.01) (0.01)* (0.03) (0.04)** (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)*
Initial regional investment 0.39 0.58 0.63 0.24 -0.02 -0.29 0.88 -0.17 -0.23 0.16
(0.11)*** (0.15)*** (0.17)*** (0.08)*** (0.08) (0.21) (0.41)** (0.19) (0.12)* (0.20)
Initial national market share 2.74 2.55 8.32 0.51 1.72 4.67 0.72 0.90 1.62 0.39
(0.99)*** (1.47)* (2.13)*** (0.93) (0.66)** (0.60)*** (1.41) (2.50) (0.52)*** (0.45)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -1.83 -4.18 -2.36 -0.73 0.44 -0.05 -5.34 -0.79 -0.13 0.18
(0.91)** (1.25)*** (1.36)* (0.88) (0.56) (1.04) (2.79)* (1.01) (0.87) (0.75)
Observations 1935 1856 2107 1898 1984 208 201 236 208 217
Number of firms 441 425 449 432 440 115 112 128 115 117
F-st. for PT_concentr’s ins-t 31.00 38.20 24.43 25.41 31.15 6.07 2.08 3.05 4.12 3.96
F-st. for PT_number’s instr-t 24.67 23.51 27.58 21.12 27.27 4.64 2.39 3.94 3.67 4.86
Subsample of firms without preferential treatments Subsample of firms with preferential treatments
 
Note: All dependent variables are in logs. In the regressions for the subsample of firms with no political influence, we take log of  PT_concentr to improve the quality 
of its  instrument. PT_concentr, log(PT_concentr),  and PT_number are instrumented by their initial values.  Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level 
are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.. 
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 Table 5. Regional-level regressions: effect of capture on small business growth, aggregate growth, and tax capacity 
Growth Revenues






























Preferential treatment concentration -0.87 -0.49 -0.08 -0.01 0.46 -0.04 0.06 0.09 0.09
(0.52)* (0.27)* (0.04)* (0.02) (0.33) (0.02)* (0.04) (0.05)* (0.04)**
Number of preferential treatments -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.002 -0.02 0.004 0.004 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.03) (0.01)*** (0.004) (0.04) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log population 0.17 0.13 3.14 1.33 0.01 1.6 1.64 4.34 3.48
(0.28) (0.12) (1.57)** (0.34)*** (0.04) (0.72)** (0.87)* (1.03)*** (0.83)***
Log wage -0.1 0.62 1.35 0.78
(0.09) (0.07)*** (0.70)* (0.10)***
Initial share of population with higher education 0.02 0.08 0.03
(0.05) (0.03)*** (0.01)***
Initial level of dependent variable 0.6 0.05
(0.09)*** (0.07)
Share of oil & gas industry 0.21
(0.16)
Log of initial investment per capita 0.07
(0.05)
Log GRP per capita 1.35 0.55 0.89 0.57
(0.22)*** (0.26)** (0.28)*** (0.25)**
Constant 1.87 3.04 -27.96 -6.55 -1.07 -7.78 -8.3 -28.85 -21.09
(0.91)** (0.55)*** (12.98)** (2.63)** (0.23)*** (5.49) (6.62) (7.81)*** (6.33)***
Year and region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 212 386 278 558 346 355 421 421 426
Number of regions 72 65 71 72 70 71 72 71 72
R-squared 0.01 0.21 0.35 0.10 0.04 0.05
F-st for the instruments of PT_concentr 4.6 6.04 9.16
F-st. for the instruments of PT_number 14.76 6.98 14.62
Small business growth Tax arrears
 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. In the between-effects regressions, PT_concentr is 
instrumented by the initial PT_concentr and a dummy for ethnic republic; PT_number is instrumented by the initial value. PT_concentr and PT_number are lagged in 
fixed-effects regressions. Log wage and log GRP per capita is instrumented by lagged values in fixed-effects regressions and by initial values in between-effects 
regressions. In regressions with retail turnover as dependent variable, we used Cook’s distance (Cook 1977) to exclude outliers that had excessively strong effect on the 
estimates. In the growth regression, we subtract the initial value from GRP per capita instead of including it as a control in order to improve quality of instruments. 
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Figure 1. Basic regularities in the firm-level data 















































Non-captured regions Captured regions
 

















Non-captured regions Captured regions
 
Note: In the first chart, “captor” and “non-captor” firms are defined as firms in the top and bottom thirds of the distribution 
with respect to the average share of preferential treatments, respectively. In the second and third charts, “captured” and “non-
captured” regions are defined as regions in the top and bottom thirds of the distribution with respect to the value of the average 
residual preferential treatment concentration, respectively. Black bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
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coef = .01221568, se = .0327096, t = .37
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Figure 3. Cross-sectional residual correlation of TI & INDEM capture index and concentration of preferential treatments (our measure of 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Construction of the preferential treatment concentration measure 
  Preferential treatments 
Years: 1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Firms in Arkhangelsk oblast                            
“Severodvinskaya Heating Station”  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
The other 16 firms from the region  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Regional preferential treatment concentration 0.2  0.2  0.2  1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
Regional number of preferential treatments 0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Firms in Omsk oblast                            
"Omskshina"  0  0  0  0  3  3  1  1  0 
"Polet"  0  0  1  1  2  1  1  1  1 
"Omskenergo"  0  0  1  1  1  0  0  0  0 
"Omsk Meat Factory"  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0 
The other 9 firms from the region  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Regional preferential treatment concentration 0.2  0.2  0.5  0.5  0.39  0.44  0.5  0.5  1 
Regional number of preferential treatments 0  0  2  2  6  4  2  2  1 
Firms in Chelyabinsk oblast                            
"Magnitogorsk Metallurgic Plant"  0  0  2  2  1  2  3  1  1 
"Chelyabinsk Electrolytic Plant"  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
"Chelyabinsk Metallurgic Plant"  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
"Chealyabenergo"  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
"Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant"  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0 
"Uralaz"  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0 
The other 4 firms from the region  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Regional preferential treatment concentration 0.2  1  1  0.38  1  0.38  1  1  1 
Regional number of preferential treatments 0  1  2  4  1  4  3  1  1 
Note: We assume that the situation when none of the firms receive any preferential treatments is equivalent to having all firms receiving the same (positive) 
number of preferential treatments, thus, preferential treatment concentration in this case is equal 0.2=5*(1/5)
2. 
  31  
Table A2. Index of regulatory capture: residual average preferential treatment concentration after accounting for number of 
preferential treatments 1995-2000 
Region Index Region Index Region Index
Arkhangelsk oblast -0.306 Samara oblast -0.046 Mordovia republic 0.042
Irkutsk oblast -0.306 Karelia republic -0.032 Krasnodar krai 0.053
Kamchatka oblast -0.236 Chita oblast -0.026 Altai republic 0.053
Chuvash republic -0.195 Altai krai -0.026 Sakha (Yakutia) republic 0.058
St. Petersburg city -0.195 Saratov oblast -0.015 Stavropol krai 0.064
Karachaevo-Cherkess rep. -0.167 Kaliningrad oblast -0.013 Tyumen oblast 0.069
Ryazan oblast -0.167 Nizhny Novgorod oblast -0.006 Moscow city 0.073
Oryol oblast -0.154 Sverdlovsk oblast -0.005 Kirov oblast 0.079
Novosibirsk oblast -0.15 Adygeya republic -0.003 Bryansk oblast 0.093
Kaluga oblast -0.141 Kemerovo oblast -0.002 Vladimir oblast 0.122
Khanty-Mansi AO -0.141 Lipetsk oblast -0.002 Vologda oblast 0.134
Tambov oblast -0.137 Tver oblast -0.002 Omsk oblast 0.135
Ulyanovsk oblast -0.126 Bashkortostan republic 0 Kabardino-Balkar republic 0.137
Ivanovo oblast -0.125 Perm oblast 0.001 Tomsk oblast 0.14
Sakhalin oblast -0.12 Kostroma oblast 0.002 Kursk oblast 0.163
Yaroslavl oblast -0.114 Dagestan republic 0.01 Orenburg oblast 0.178
Astrakhan oblast -0.101 Rostov oblast 0.012 Kurgan oblast 0.189
Smolensk oblast -0.098 Volgograd oblast 0.016 Magadan oblast 0.189
Khabarovsk krai -0.097 Mari-El republic 0.024 Murmansk oblast 0.189
Voronezh oblast -0.088 Khakasia republic 0.024 Tatarstan republic 0.213
Belgorod oblast -0.087 Krasnoyarsk krai 0.024 Udmurtia Republic 0.258
Primorskii krai -0.071 Amur oblast 0.036 Komi republic 0.403
Novgorod oblast -0.071 Penza oblast 0.037 Chelyabinsk oblast 0.416
Pskov oblast -0.071 Moskow oblast 0.039
Evrei autonomous oblast -0.071 Tula oblast 0.042  
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